Nukes for Everyman
Nukes for Everyman.
Every since the end of the second war and after the use of atomic weapons on two cities and in seeing the huge destruction that was caused, it has been of concern to the ‘four’ major powers to attempt to stop any undesirable elements from gaining the same WMD. That this has not been successful is a result of political expediency and the inability to actually stop the knowledge of how to make nukes from disseminating to those that have the aspiration to obtain the information and in some cases for others to have actually been given it. The original reason for the attempt to limit the spread of such weapons was driven by the desire to see that they would not be used again. The major powers took it upon themselves to become the custodian and guardian against potential indiscriminate use by ‘immature’ parties.
To some extent this restraining tack slowed the spread of the technical ability of the manufacturing knowledge but only with those countries that lacked the economic muscle or strategic importance to pursue development for their own munitions base. For 40 years the possibility of a nuke war was a threat that was in play with the growth of the ‘cold war’ and the fear of nukes use, this acted as a break on the excesses of government belligerent actions. During the same period a huge amount of effort went into making the bomb more effective and efficient, in the name of peace of course and the existence of the bomb has been credited with the fact that no major conflict has occurred, using nukes, despite the disagreement between government and countries with apposing ideology.
The perceived reality was that any such conflict would unleash such a rain of nuke destruction that all antagonist would be eliminated, hence there would be no winner. This was the MAD scenario that developed a false sense of security with the occasional scary moments, (notably the Cuban crisis) yet it did not ease the drive for bigger and better bangs.
Perhaps it was the rising pressure of public opinion, CND etc and the radioactive fall out from air test that helped speed the process to limit such developments and stabilise stock to a holding level. Later reducing stocks while at the same time increasing efforts into raining back the expertise filtering into other (unsafe) hands. But as of now 8 countries have access to nukes and others deny seeking it.
In order to produce nukes, one of the elements required was plutonium and in the early days this was in sort supply. This was alleviated by the created drive to gain a demonstratable peaceful use for nuke energy and so nuclear energy reactors were born. Although there was no real demand for nuclear energy as oil, coal and gas were readily available; the push to integrate nuclear energy production into the market and make it acceptable was ‘sold’ on the basis that it would be so much cheaper in the long term.
The oil shock of the sixties was the indication that a total reliance on oil could not be tolerated and this stimulates a greater drive for nuclear energy. A fruitful and happy side effect of the nuke power stations was the spare plutonium that was generated and this went into bomb production. So, as well as the offensive capability of nukes, there was the civil application of nuke energy. However the stark long-term damage that can be caused from the deliberate or accidental release of radioactive material into the atmosphere, as evident with Long Island, Sellerfield, Chernobyl and the careless dump disposal of waste, together with the huge after cost of radioactive waste storage/disposal, gave more ammunition to turn public opinion against nuclear activity.
For a brief period there was the possibility of turning away from the production of nukes entirely as a number of things had change over the years, the main one was the meeting of minds in the political sphere, in recognising that there is more to be gained in peaceful cooperation. The west (includes the USSR) being the strongest holder of nukes had too much to loose in the advent of a nuke war. MAD served its purpose in promoting uncertainty of a winner in a conflict. Now the overt continuation of MAD serves little purpose in attempting to hold each in fear, as a consensus has been built that one power does not have ravenous eyes on the other. One could never gain superiority over the other through force, particular if there is nothing left of either contender or indeed of a wider world zone.
So nukes in the west have served their purpose, is has been argued the their presence has promoted peace for the past 50 year between major powers and because of such peace it has led to the rapid growth in technology and the world economy, fostered by the ‘peace dividend’ arms and space technology race. Regrettably this peace dividend is about to change.
It is no secret that the holding of nukes gave those countries a distinct potential advantage over those that did not. Leaving aside the actual use of these weapons in a conflict against weaker nuke or non nuke countries, the effectiveness of them is limited to mass destruction against asset that are not essential to the users needs. In this sense it was a comfort to the west that it could if necessary use nukes without destroying the sources of raw material to aid recovery, as old ‘cold war’ potential targets had little power to offer.
The technical knowledge built up to develop the generation of nuke electrical power helped offset a little of the total reliance on oil based consumption. As the major production of oil was derived from the Middle East and operated on a subtle ‘quid pro quo’ arrangement, there was little difficulty in balancing the world supply and demand unless the providers suffered a production curtailment. As has been shown in the past it does not take much to upset this production consumer balance and although access to the oil market and supplies then fall into the market forces trap, the subsequent painful retrenchment of the world economy, energy use and price, forces a new consumer balance.
Now the past decade has seen a slow decline the discover and recovery of oil, this with the increased use and demand from growing economies now puts pressure on the availability of oil based energy use and this in turn will affect the price mechanism. In the early stage the flux of supply can be managed, while new supplies are found and bought on stream with the price mechanism offering a small respite in consumption. This in itself will not be an issue in so far and as long as the richer countries can afford to pay and move resources to finding other alternatives. The danger is the speed at which this flux will happen, the affect it will have on developing and much poorer countries and how producer countries survive after the wells run dry.
It seems clear that the most powerful will demand their oil supplies backed by the use of force. Those that cannot match such force will have to concede supplies. It is in this context that the interest of the west is seen to be served by denying access to nukes to others not already in the club. How long this state of affair can be tolerated is time limited. Knowing there will be a world energy shortage and holding back the means of potentially ameliorating the effect that nuclear energy production could offer, is not defensible. The risk of danger from the miss use of provided controlled nuclear energy production is far less than the danger of having unsatisfied hoards attacking borders as they have been economically eviscerated and left unable to build a future.
In the past and so long as energy supplies remained stable the west managed over oil not being in their direct control, as long as it can afford to pay with the strength of its manufacturing / service revenues, however this too is changing. Willing buyer and willing seller benefited from the mutual market arrangement and no overt force is necessary to maintain stability but as has happened on a number of occasion when the supply is threaten its takes covert action. Or as in the case Suez, Kuwait, Iraq - direct action.
Now Iran and Korea want to join the nuclear energy game, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Libya may like to follow – the prerequisite is having the financial and technical acquisition ability to bring the desire to fruition. The assumption in the west is that this move is in order to potentially obtain offensive nuke capability even if the delivery mechanism is undeveloped.
An alternative view could be that the drive to go nuke may well be the growing realisation that those that have a credible nuke option will be able to press for a share of the diminishing energy resources and provide for the survival of their culture. It is difficult to avoid the assumption that once the pressure of energy short supply is evident that many other countries must develop the nuke capacity.
The pressure will be on the UN and west to adopt a more open utilisation of energy technology and in the short term support the development of nuke power stations, as the only realistic substitute to help offset the forthcoming energy decline. Dependant on which report one reads the severe energy tipping point will come in 15 or 30 years and as it take 5/8 years to bring on stream a power plant, it will take a massive effort to replace diminishing supplies in time. In fact the tipping point will occur much earlier and the strategic decision to camouflage indigenous supplies will only provide a limited safety net and little time. Plasma fusion may not be acquired any quicker so saps must move now.
P11.11.05
Every since the end of the second war and after the use of atomic weapons on two cities and in seeing the huge destruction that was caused, it has been of concern to the ‘four’ major powers to attempt to stop any undesirable elements from gaining the same WMD. That this has not been successful is a result of political expediency and the inability to actually stop the knowledge of how to make nukes from disseminating to those that have the aspiration to obtain the information and in some cases for others to have actually been given it. The original reason for the attempt to limit the spread of such weapons was driven by the desire to see that they would not be used again. The major powers took it upon themselves to become the custodian and guardian against potential indiscriminate use by ‘immature’ parties.
To some extent this restraining tack slowed the spread of the technical ability of the manufacturing knowledge but only with those countries that lacked the economic muscle or strategic importance to pursue development for their own munitions base. For 40 years the possibility of a nuke war was a threat that was in play with the growth of the ‘cold war’ and the fear of nukes use, this acted as a break on the excesses of government belligerent actions. During the same period a huge amount of effort went into making the bomb more effective and efficient, in the name of peace of course and the existence of the bomb has been credited with the fact that no major conflict has occurred, using nukes, despite the disagreement between government and countries with apposing ideology.
The perceived reality was that any such conflict would unleash such a rain of nuke destruction that all antagonist would be eliminated, hence there would be no winner. This was the MAD scenario that developed a false sense of security with the occasional scary moments, (notably the Cuban crisis) yet it did not ease the drive for bigger and better bangs.
Perhaps it was the rising pressure of public opinion, CND etc and the radioactive fall out from air test that helped speed the process to limit such developments and stabilise stock to a holding level. Later reducing stocks while at the same time increasing efforts into raining back the expertise filtering into other (unsafe) hands. But as of now 8 countries have access to nukes and others deny seeking it.
In order to produce nukes, one of the elements required was plutonium and in the early days this was in sort supply. This was alleviated by the created drive to gain a demonstratable peaceful use for nuke energy and so nuclear energy reactors were born. Although there was no real demand for nuclear energy as oil, coal and gas were readily available; the push to integrate nuclear energy production into the market and make it acceptable was ‘sold’ on the basis that it would be so much cheaper in the long term.
The oil shock of the sixties was the indication that a total reliance on oil could not be tolerated and this stimulates a greater drive for nuclear energy. A fruitful and happy side effect of the nuke power stations was the spare plutonium that was generated and this went into bomb production. So, as well as the offensive capability of nukes, there was the civil application of nuke energy. However the stark long-term damage that can be caused from the deliberate or accidental release of radioactive material into the atmosphere, as evident with Long Island, Sellerfield, Chernobyl and the careless dump disposal of waste, together with the huge after cost of radioactive waste storage/disposal, gave more ammunition to turn public opinion against nuclear activity.
For a brief period there was the possibility of turning away from the production of nukes entirely as a number of things had change over the years, the main one was the meeting of minds in the political sphere, in recognising that there is more to be gained in peaceful cooperation. The west (includes the USSR) being the strongest holder of nukes had too much to loose in the advent of a nuke war. MAD served its purpose in promoting uncertainty of a winner in a conflict. Now the overt continuation of MAD serves little purpose in attempting to hold each in fear, as a consensus has been built that one power does not have ravenous eyes on the other. One could never gain superiority over the other through force, particular if there is nothing left of either contender or indeed of a wider world zone.
So nukes in the west have served their purpose, is has been argued the their presence has promoted peace for the past 50 year between major powers and because of such peace it has led to the rapid growth in technology and the world economy, fostered by the ‘peace dividend’ arms and space technology race. Regrettably this peace dividend is about to change.
It is no secret that the holding of nukes gave those countries a distinct potential advantage over those that did not. Leaving aside the actual use of these weapons in a conflict against weaker nuke or non nuke countries, the effectiveness of them is limited to mass destruction against asset that are not essential to the users needs. In this sense it was a comfort to the west that it could if necessary use nukes without destroying the sources of raw material to aid recovery, as old ‘cold war’ potential targets had little power to offer.
The technical knowledge built up to develop the generation of nuke electrical power helped offset a little of the total reliance on oil based consumption. As the major production of oil was derived from the Middle East and operated on a subtle ‘quid pro quo’ arrangement, there was little difficulty in balancing the world supply and demand unless the providers suffered a production curtailment. As has been shown in the past it does not take much to upset this production consumer balance and although access to the oil market and supplies then fall into the market forces trap, the subsequent painful retrenchment of the world economy, energy use and price, forces a new consumer balance.
Now the past decade has seen a slow decline the discover and recovery of oil, this with the increased use and demand from growing economies now puts pressure on the availability of oil based energy use and this in turn will affect the price mechanism. In the early stage the flux of supply can be managed, while new supplies are found and bought on stream with the price mechanism offering a small respite in consumption. This in itself will not be an issue in so far and as long as the richer countries can afford to pay and move resources to finding other alternatives. The danger is the speed at which this flux will happen, the affect it will have on developing and much poorer countries and how producer countries survive after the wells run dry.
It seems clear that the most powerful will demand their oil supplies backed by the use of force. Those that cannot match such force will have to concede supplies. It is in this context that the interest of the west is seen to be served by denying access to nukes to others not already in the club. How long this state of affair can be tolerated is time limited. Knowing there will be a world energy shortage and holding back the means of potentially ameliorating the effect that nuclear energy production could offer, is not defensible. The risk of danger from the miss use of provided controlled nuclear energy production is far less than the danger of having unsatisfied hoards attacking borders as they have been economically eviscerated and left unable to build a future.
In the past and so long as energy supplies remained stable the west managed over oil not being in their direct control, as long as it can afford to pay with the strength of its manufacturing / service revenues, however this too is changing. Willing buyer and willing seller benefited from the mutual market arrangement and no overt force is necessary to maintain stability but as has happened on a number of occasion when the supply is threaten its takes covert action. Or as in the case Suez, Kuwait, Iraq - direct action.
Now Iran and Korea want to join the nuclear energy game, Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Libya may like to follow – the prerequisite is having the financial and technical acquisition ability to bring the desire to fruition. The assumption in the west is that this move is in order to potentially obtain offensive nuke capability even if the delivery mechanism is undeveloped.
An alternative view could be that the drive to go nuke may well be the growing realisation that those that have a credible nuke option will be able to press for a share of the diminishing energy resources and provide for the survival of their culture. It is difficult to avoid the assumption that once the pressure of energy short supply is evident that many other countries must develop the nuke capacity.
The pressure will be on the UN and west to adopt a more open utilisation of energy technology and in the short term support the development of nuke power stations, as the only realistic substitute to help offset the forthcoming energy decline. Dependant on which report one reads the severe energy tipping point will come in 15 or 30 years and as it take 5/8 years to bring on stream a power plant, it will take a massive effort to replace diminishing supplies in time. In fact the tipping point will occur much earlier and the strategic decision to camouflage indigenous supplies will only provide a limited safety net and little time. Plasma fusion may not be acquired any quicker so saps must move now.
P11.11.05
posted by Renot at 7:17 am
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