Russia's Rushing Revolution
Let’s hear it for Russia.
Russia as it is known now, or in days gone by as the USSR, has had a history that is remarkable and as complex by any competitive modern standard as any throughout Europe or the Americas. As a country of diverse indigenous populations melded together under a soviet or federation mantel, it possessed in its early form sufficient power and strength to rival any states of the modern era and it might be suggested that had it not lost its way with the Crimean war and the 1917 uprising, it could have been of pre-eminence influence throughout the European continent. It played a pivotal role during the 2nd WW from which developed the subsequent cold war machination. It has since suffered for it.
Although it had been named as one of the 20th century supper powers; just as other holders of the title, it is a title that is over stretched if one examines the integrated depth of its economic social infrastructure. This defect applies to every proposed ostentatious super power. See Superpower 4.7.08.
Russia (federation) is a huge country with population demographics and geography that is scarcely matched by any other country. Russia now is a country of 142 million people, of 17m sq miles, at half the population and 6 times as large as its nearest challenger the USA. It is much larger that any single European country and has the world’s largest untapped natural reserves. China and India head the population numbers list but have never demonstrated any practical influence over European affairs apart from their productive capacity and have not laboured under the modern mantle of a superpower, unlike the USSR/Russia.
For the past few weeks there has transpired a great deal of fuss being kicked up by ‘the west’ over the offensive military action by Georgia and the reaction by Russia over disputed Georgian territory. This is risible if one considers how it came about. What on earth was Georgia’s president Sakashvili thinking in starting a military action on its own disputed soil against its own disputed people that happen to hold and prefer Russia authority to Georgia? The lunacy of Georgia must only be seen in the light of a strategic gamble by Georgia that due to its encouragement by the USA to vie for a joining positioning in NATO, it felt encouraged to force some action. This action, it might have presumed, would have given it immediate support by the existing NATO countries. Perhaps even to compelling NATO countries into joining in a conflict against the reaction of Russia. Such rogue madness of political mendacity should be seen for what it was, as a provocative gamble by an unpopular president in a country that is hardly democratic, ruled by a bunch of corrupt criminally connected opportunist. Anyone could have expressed the view that Russia would not allow such destructive action to succeed particular from a country that was until 1990s a satellite of the USSR and had tolerated a running dispute over split bordering regions.
The attempt by the us to move Georgia to become a member of NATO, primarily for its own reasons to extend its influence as far as possible into the ex soviet countries; was fortunately by Germany and France stymied. However its possibility did give Georgia the idea of pressing its claim over the disputed areas, albeit that they are recognised by the west as Georgian ‘territories’. This denial of easing Georgia into NATO was after the us blocked any move by other members of NATO to consider Russia as a NATO member and was taken as a callous rejection by Russia considering Russians acquiescence and help on a number of topical issues like Afghanistan and the ‘war on terror’.
Never the less it should be a lesson to Europe and the us that such disputed areas are better being actively managed to a concessionary point than allowing them to be used as geopolitical pawns onto a NATO platform and realise that the idea of having another rogue state like Georgia using a NATO card could possible ferment an actual war with Russia.
Much of the current disharmony within Europe over what to do about the success of Russia moving swiftly to trounce Georgian military stems from two reasons.
A) Russia was beginning to be seen as a country that was being more politically responsible, reasonably businesslike and open and on a better communication level with the western interest. Things were moving quietly to a level of political understanding.
B) It came as a surprise and shock at how fast Russia would and could react once its core interest were threatened. This more than anything else frighten the European interest for they realised that their own internal machinery e.g. NATO could not match the fast decision process capable of meeting a future threat if ever it was required.
C) And of course the investment risk and availability of the oil and gas that some countries of Europe are beginning to heavily rely on.
The tragedy over the issue of Georgia has been to some extent a situation of the west own making. Europe has been too busy extending EU membership as part of the great project like extending EU membership to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, and playing warm up with Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia and maybe later the western Balkans without putting structure in place that form the hard framework of self reliance. It has allowed the us to dictate too much direction within the NATO framework, upon which it is totally reliant and ignored the practicalities of extending the EU project without reframing the NATO commitment within the context of the European continent. The us is busy in cosseting the Ukraine and Belarus for an extraneous strategic reason much to the annoyance of Russia with little input by the EU. These two countries, geographical, should be of more relevance to the EU than Georgia.
Some of the political short-sightedness is as a result of the rapidly changing structure of Russia. For a number of reasons the imploding of communism that had battled against the west idealism of freedom and democracy should have been the beginning of a renaissance for Russia and the EU. Unfortunately as the west was locked into the struggle with the cold war along side the us, it paid little attention the after effect of the turmoil that afflicted Russia after 1991 driven by B Yeltsin (and the denoted collapse of communism, all of which was fermented much earlier by M Gorbachov) and neglected to participate in any form of reconstruction but rather fostered dubious unworkable economic advice. This practical neglect of Russian difficulties, some would say that with the promotion of the ideology of free market forces onto the early leadership of the struggling Russia; was destructive and that external ‘advice’ helped ferment the theft of state assets to oligarchs that bought or stole at little cost or public resistance, the very foundations of its productive infrastructure and by doings so destroying it ability to operate constructive development control. This in a county that has still yet to get to grips with developing robust transparent legal structures.
The west should have seen the danger of undermining Russia but the cold war poisoned the west view of Russia, savouring the ‘victory’ of overcoming communism that blinded it to the subsequent unfolding corruption. Russia’s failure to wholeheartedly move democracy and the sensitivity Russia felt over its near failed state status was an expected outcome, this situation was taken up by Putin to re centralise authoritive control.
With newly exploitable resources being extracted with western technical and financial input, Russia is re-establishing itself by reclaiming centralised authority under loosely democratic principles. Under Putin it started to understand that it could not afford a westernised form of economics without the social and administrative infrastructure that have taken decades for the west to establish. For Russia to survive it had to take consensual dictatorial administrative power to channel and control its exploitable resources. It is these resources that the EU desperately needs and will form the basis of wealth generation for Russia which to allow it to play a big part in the affairs of Europe. Unfortunately the west is still hung up with suspicion and fear of having a large ‘totalitarian’ county on the edge of modern Europe and it does not know how to deal with it or on what long term basis a mutual relationship should be formed, other than becoming quiescently dependent on Russian energy production.
Now after the Georgian incident such dependency is considered risky or potential unreliable. The only response that the EU can muster is to put in place puny sanctions.
The idea of instigating any sanction against Russia, as has been mooted for its excursion into a offensive action, is brainless, as is the idea that had Russia not intervened swiftly that any country of the EU, UN or NATO would have interceded much earlier to stop Georgiana military from killing its (own ?) people on it own disputed soil. Yugoslavia, Srebrenica, or Rwanda should have put an end to that wistful idea that any of those organisation can response fast, if at all. The EU is not concerted enough yet to form a working forceful response on anything.
That Russia and its ex satellite state do create a problem for the EU and NATO seems clear and a resolution is required. Part of the solution is to have the EU do what it has so far failed to do and that is being independently forceful. It needs to stop relying on NATO (America) and develop forces under its own control and use. For this it has to have a sovereign status that can bypass the individual political lethargic process and pool a greater element of its military capacity. EU countries like Germany have to take up the problem of its constitution that forbids any of its forces being used outside NATO in combative fields, a problem seen in Afghanistan. It has to consolidate its position and not expand with increases into unstable territories but in preference it has to move to start considering Russia as an in integral part of the developing European continent; it is the potential heart of Eurasia and the EU should move to develop co operative partnership without the lean of the us.
Given the fact that Russia is on the brink of redeveloping its strategic strength, then it would be as well for Western Europe to finds ways of discussing an initial assimilation partnership with Russia. Unlike the established EU, Russia has many inter faction and post satellite countries that can suffer from calls for demographic / racial independence, creating difficulties for Russia itself and an apparent homogenous stable EU or new territorial state with ethnic differences. Such difference of demographics within satellite countries have to be resolved first and will not be done effectively if the west keeps Russia at arms length or attempts to ‘cheery pick off’ ex soviet states for the sake of the project and energy exploitation.
Russia is in the process of re stabling itself on a world stage. Within a decade Russia it is likely that Russia will be more important to Europe than either China or the us and it is therefore more important to consider its future development and attitude. This is not to say that the Russians federation is completely compatible with the ideals of the EU as it stands just now nor is it likely to be in the short term but ignoring its aspiration and the power that its new found wealth will bring, is not a progressive option. Many of the fears that the west has, stem from uncertainty of direction and its lack of cohesive strength. The question is whether Russia will use its new financial resources to rebuild it’s dilapidate military machinery in response to hyped threats or concentrate on its social democratic structures with the help of the EU.
After some 90 years of political turmoil and social instability with little consolidated infrastructure that benefits the whole of the Russian people and territory, Russia is now rushing to catch up with the rapid expansion of wealth and status that china has achieved. Such growth that china has done, has been without the benefit of oil or gas reserves but achieved on the basis of solid administrative structures and being the projected work shop of the consuming western world. Russia has the opportunity of doing much better. Its energy exploitation to Europe is bringing it substantial ‘sovereign’ wealth, this with it being much closer to the consumer market, offers great opportunities for growth that neither the EU nor it can achieve on their own. It will also give something more precious, not available by force, peace, (full) cooperation to face the dangers an angry Gaia.
© Renot 2008
809081450
Russia as it is known now, or in days gone by as the USSR, has had a history that is remarkable and as complex by any competitive modern standard as any throughout Europe or the Americas. As a country of diverse indigenous populations melded together under a soviet or federation mantel, it possessed in its early form sufficient power and strength to rival any states of the modern era and it might be suggested that had it not lost its way with the Crimean war and the 1917 uprising, it could have been of pre-eminence influence throughout the European continent. It played a pivotal role during the 2nd WW from which developed the subsequent cold war machination. It has since suffered for it.
Although it had been named as one of the 20th century supper powers; just as other holders of the title, it is a title that is over stretched if one examines the integrated depth of its economic social infrastructure. This defect applies to every proposed ostentatious super power. See Superpower 4.7.08.
Russia (federation) is a huge country with population demographics and geography that is scarcely matched by any other country. Russia now is a country of 142 million people, of 17m sq miles, at half the population and 6 times as large as its nearest challenger the USA. It is much larger that any single European country and has the world’s largest untapped natural reserves. China and India head the population numbers list but have never demonstrated any practical influence over European affairs apart from their productive capacity and have not laboured under the modern mantle of a superpower, unlike the USSR/Russia.
For the past few weeks there has transpired a great deal of fuss being kicked up by ‘the west’ over the offensive military action by Georgia and the reaction by Russia over disputed Georgian territory. This is risible if one considers how it came about. What on earth was Georgia’s president Sakashvili thinking in starting a military action on its own disputed soil against its own disputed people that happen to hold and prefer Russia authority to Georgia? The lunacy of Georgia must only be seen in the light of a strategic gamble by Georgia that due to its encouragement by the USA to vie for a joining positioning in NATO, it felt encouraged to force some action. This action, it might have presumed, would have given it immediate support by the existing NATO countries. Perhaps even to compelling NATO countries into joining in a conflict against the reaction of Russia. Such rogue madness of political mendacity should be seen for what it was, as a provocative gamble by an unpopular president in a country that is hardly democratic, ruled by a bunch of corrupt criminally connected opportunist. Anyone could have expressed the view that Russia would not allow such destructive action to succeed particular from a country that was until 1990s a satellite of the USSR and had tolerated a running dispute over split bordering regions.
The attempt by the us to move Georgia to become a member of NATO, primarily for its own reasons to extend its influence as far as possible into the ex soviet countries; was fortunately by Germany and France stymied. However its possibility did give Georgia the idea of pressing its claim over the disputed areas, albeit that they are recognised by the west as Georgian ‘territories’. This denial of easing Georgia into NATO was after the us blocked any move by other members of NATO to consider Russia as a NATO member and was taken as a callous rejection by Russia considering Russians acquiescence and help on a number of topical issues like Afghanistan and the ‘war on terror’.
Never the less it should be a lesson to Europe and the us that such disputed areas are better being actively managed to a concessionary point than allowing them to be used as geopolitical pawns onto a NATO platform and realise that the idea of having another rogue state like Georgia using a NATO card could possible ferment an actual war with Russia.
Much of the current disharmony within Europe over what to do about the success of Russia moving swiftly to trounce Georgian military stems from two reasons.
A) Russia was beginning to be seen as a country that was being more politically responsible, reasonably businesslike and open and on a better communication level with the western interest. Things were moving quietly to a level of political understanding.
B) It came as a surprise and shock at how fast Russia would and could react once its core interest were threatened. This more than anything else frighten the European interest for they realised that their own internal machinery e.g. NATO could not match the fast decision process capable of meeting a future threat if ever it was required.
C) And of course the investment risk and availability of the oil and gas that some countries of Europe are beginning to heavily rely on.
The tragedy over the issue of Georgia has been to some extent a situation of the west own making. Europe has been too busy extending EU membership as part of the great project like extending EU membership to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, and playing warm up with Croatia, Turkey, Macedonia and maybe later the western Balkans without putting structure in place that form the hard framework of self reliance. It has allowed the us to dictate too much direction within the NATO framework, upon which it is totally reliant and ignored the practicalities of extending the EU project without reframing the NATO commitment within the context of the European continent. The us is busy in cosseting the Ukraine and Belarus for an extraneous strategic reason much to the annoyance of Russia with little input by the EU. These two countries, geographical, should be of more relevance to the EU than Georgia.
Some of the political short-sightedness is as a result of the rapidly changing structure of Russia. For a number of reasons the imploding of communism that had battled against the west idealism of freedom and democracy should have been the beginning of a renaissance for Russia and the EU. Unfortunately as the west was locked into the struggle with the cold war along side the us, it paid little attention the after effect of the turmoil that afflicted Russia after 1991 driven by B Yeltsin (and the denoted collapse of communism, all of which was fermented much earlier by M Gorbachov) and neglected to participate in any form of reconstruction but rather fostered dubious unworkable economic advice. This practical neglect of Russian difficulties, some would say that with the promotion of the ideology of free market forces onto the early leadership of the struggling Russia; was destructive and that external ‘advice’ helped ferment the theft of state assets to oligarchs that bought or stole at little cost or public resistance, the very foundations of its productive infrastructure and by doings so destroying it ability to operate constructive development control. This in a county that has still yet to get to grips with developing robust transparent legal structures.
The west should have seen the danger of undermining Russia but the cold war poisoned the west view of Russia, savouring the ‘victory’ of overcoming communism that blinded it to the subsequent unfolding corruption. Russia’s failure to wholeheartedly move democracy and the sensitivity Russia felt over its near failed state status was an expected outcome, this situation was taken up by Putin to re centralise authoritive control.
With newly exploitable resources being extracted with western technical and financial input, Russia is re-establishing itself by reclaiming centralised authority under loosely democratic principles. Under Putin it started to understand that it could not afford a westernised form of economics without the social and administrative infrastructure that have taken decades for the west to establish. For Russia to survive it had to take consensual dictatorial administrative power to channel and control its exploitable resources. It is these resources that the EU desperately needs and will form the basis of wealth generation for Russia which to allow it to play a big part in the affairs of Europe. Unfortunately the west is still hung up with suspicion and fear of having a large ‘totalitarian’ county on the edge of modern Europe and it does not know how to deal with it or on what long term basis a mutual relationship should be formed, other than becoming quiescently dependent on Russian energy production.
Now after the Georgian incident such dependency is considered risky or potential unreliable. The only response that the EU can muster is to put in place puny sanctions.
The idea of instigating any sanction against Russia, as has been mooted for its excursion into a offensive action, is brainless, as is the idea that had Russia not intervened swiftly that any country of the EU, UN or NATO would have interceded much earlier to stop Georgiana military from killing its (own ?) people on it own disputed soil. Yugoslavia, Srebrenica, or Rwanda should have put an end to that wistful idea that any of those organisation can response fast, if at all. The EU is not concerted enough yet to form a working forceful response on anything.
That Russia and its ex satellite state do create a problem for the EU and NATO seems clear and a resolution is required. Part of the solution is to have the EU do what it has so far failed to do and that is being independently forceful. It needs to stop relying on NATO (America) and develop forces under its own control and use. For this it has to have a sovereign status that can bypass the individual political lethargic process and pool a greater element of its military capacity. EU countries like Germany have to take up the problem of its constitution that forbids any of its forces being used outside NATO in combative fields, a problem seen in Afghanistan. It has to consolidate its position and not expand with increases into unstable territories but in preference it has to move to start considering Russia as an in integral part of the developing European continent; it is the potential heart of Eurasia and the EU should move to develop co operative partnership without the lean of the us.
Given the fact that Russia is on the brink of redeveloping its strategic strength, then it would be as well for Western Europe to finds ways of discussing an initial assimilation partnership with Russia. Unlike the established EU, Russia has many inter faction and post satellite countries that can suffer from calls for demographic / racial independence, creating difficulties for Russia itself and an apparent homogenous stable EU or new territorial state with ethnic differences. Such difference of demographics within satellite countries have to be resolved first and will not be done effectively if the west keeps Russia at arms length or attempts to ‘cheery pick off’ ex soviet states for the sake of the project and energy exploitation.
Russia is in the process of re stabling itself on a world stage. Within a decade Russia it is likely that Russia will be more important to Europe than either China or the us and it is therefore more important to consider its future development and attitude. This is not to say that the Russians federation is completely compatible with the ideals of the EU as it stands just now nor is it likely to be in the short term but ignoring its aspiration and the power that its new found wealth will bring, is not a progressive option. Many of the fears that the west has, stem from uncertainty of direction and its lack of cohesive strength. The question is whether Russia will use its new financial resources to rebuild it’s dilapidate military machinery in response to hyped threats or concentrate on its social democratic structures with the help of the EU.
After some 90 years of political turmoil and social instability with little consolidated infrastructure that benefits the whole of the Russian people and territory, Russia is now rushing to catch up with the rapid expansion of wealth and status that china has achieved. Such growth that china has done, has been without the benefit of oil or gas reserves but achieved on the basis of solid administrative structures and being the projected work shop of the consuming western world. Russia has the opportunity of doing much better. Its energy exploitation to Europe is bringing it substantial ‘sovereign’ wealth, this with it being much closer to the consumer market, offers great opportunities for growth that neither the EU nor it can achieve on their own. It will also give something more precious, not available by force, peace, (full) cooperation to face the dangers an angry Gaia.
© Renot 2008
809081450
Labels: EU, Gaia, NATO, Revolution, Russia
posted by Renot at 6:46 am
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