Chilcot Inquiry
Chilcot Inquiry
The current investigation (Inquiry) into the Iraq war is going through the paces of discussions with a number of selected people that had a controlling influence on the start of it. It will involve, primarily UK personnel without any real input of the USA, the major participant in the pursuit of this war. It is a tedious but necessary process and it is hoped that it will put to rest any number of observation on the veracity of information that was used as a bases for implementing a war. Whether it will ultimately satisfy people that a war was necessary and justified based on the ‘evidence’ of the time will continue to be open to debate.
Many of the key players are to have their day in the question seat some more than once and when required are allowed to give ‘evidence’ ‘in camera’ not open to any public hearing and therefore deemed to be of a secret nature as required of J. Scarlett, DG of MI6 2009. This possibility alone will be enough to keep open the debate; after having reviewed all information leading up to the war, what was the driving force behind the ultimate decision? Never the less there may not be any startling insights amongst the very carefully adjusted response themes to questions the panel will place on the hot seat.
Can there now be any doubt that the hyped statement of a 45 min launch window of WMD to land on the UK doorstep, which was the intended interpretation that was allowed to be placed before people as the reason to nail Saddam, had it any justification? Presumably no one now thinks that it was, if ever it was, wholly the case and never-mind any contra indication flowing from other expert sources.
There may have been other reason for the invasion; some believe it had much to do with long held plan of the American administration from bush senior to junior of unfinished business after the Kuwait invasion by Iraq and concern about stability in the region of oil resources. This may have been the American view with some evidence that there was an ongoing preparatory dialogue taking place which was given major stimulus, although diversionary, with the 9.11 attack. But this was not the UK point – it was more one of using the usual diplomatic channels via the UN and being aggressively proactive in the face of unsupportive and resistant EU members, a tack that was unsuccessful leading to the supportive passionate application of force alongside the US.
Not highlight in all the investigation of the persons concerned will be the 2 prime functions. (1) The belief driven view taken up by Blair to support the American mendacious view promoting a war and (2) The drive to be seen to be tackling the after effect of 9.11.01 and 7.7.05, compounding the misguided psychosis creation of a war on terror. Also it was important to be seen as a key player to the UK's most import ‘ally’ reliant on this constructed war on terror premise as it is expected that US support will be required in a future difficulty and on one were the UK will have to look to for succour when time become hard. It is this that is the ideological reason the UK succumbed to the worst political incompetence of modern times.
There are many questions that Chilcot will attempt to gain answer to within the remit of its terms of reference, this will of course exclude any subject it is not specifically allowed to look into or indeed pass a ‘judgment’ on, such as the legality of the war or to suggest any lies were constructed to deceive parliament. At a guess it will be shown that there was a process of a systemic creation of hubris to support an engendered view that some direct action for an unwarranted state of affairs, caused by Saddam, must be taken and this hubris was to find a way to create the dubious rational for action, no matter what, for doing it; ultimately inflicting an unnecessary and potential questionable illegal war onto Iraq.
For some the most startling piece of information to come out of the inquiry thus far, is not the miss-application of evidence, duplicity, hubris, cabinet cabal and neutered parliamentary assessment but something uniquely damaging to the UK. It may have been missed but the evident ‘theory driven belief’ systems that so guided Blair in his pursuit of inflicting war on Iraq is most amazing. From this belief came the near fervent apostolic conviction for him to judge without doubt and against advice or limited evidence that there was a direct immediate threat to the UK, or regions closer to Iraq that had much more to be worried about, is astonishing. This belief on its own was enough to carry his arguments forward and manipulate enough power to win over opposition. This action was presidential in style and gave him the use of the ‘royal prerogative’ an action that could be similar to tacit dictatorial power. However this is not a dictatorship so one person should not have the power to force a country to go to war, yet with his carful manipulation and clever disingenuous dialogue and the complicity of key parties together with acolytes in cabinet and a distinct lack of hard perusal of the evidence by parliament to launch an attack; war was made.
What Chilcot will not find is that the war was not an illegal one. That decision has already been made and will be allowed to remain vague for sovereign reason. It will not be challenged, for there are too many obstacles to overrule and more importantly by far, too much to risk to even suggest a counter legal view from such an inquiry that has no legal power. The future has an uncomfortable way of rewriting the past. Done too soon and it opens a massive problem – reparation for war crime, one the UK cannot afford to condone.
The report when it is published will without doubt highlight a massive failure in parliamentary proceeding, over excessive executive pressure and a culpable miss direction laid on and by the cabinet which was not questioned. There was a systemic failure to investigate information that had parliament done so would have made the affliction of a war at best unnecessary or worse possibly delayed it. Events would have, given Saddam’s Iraq pernicious ethos against its own people, eventually matured and created an alternative strategic necessity.
No doubt some people will be held critical, some process will be judge as deeply flawed, parliamentary process will have failed catastrophically, lives may have been lost unnecessary and some indicative evidence will not see the light of day. However there is a long term danger in this inquiry for the UK and it is a danger that will not affect the USA for it will not go through the same self flagellation over its mistakes as the UK. It is unlikely to ever have its own Chilcot inquiry. The danger will perhaps be on two counts. The UK in the eye of the EU and others will be open to having been willingly cohered into action by the need to be seen to keep a robust special relationship with the US and will have lost political creditability for a relationship that is one of subservience for very little reward or actual recognition. The other danger is more immediately tenuous and it is one related to the ability of the UK to ever respond to a threat unilaterally (ref Falklands) or in concert with others, against public and some political objection that will have become distrustful of politicians and wholly against participating in any other conflicts. Even if it wanted too, the process to gain agreement by parliament will in future be slow and tortuous, so much so that any urgency for immediate reaction will be lost and detrimental to minimal risk for armed forces. It is not difficult to see that in any future tension that could lead to conflict, the UK will step aside. In this event, will the prominent EU members step to the plate where it failed with former Yugoslavia etc?
© Renot 2010
2320100730
The current investigation (Inquiry) into the Iraq war is going through the paces of discussions with a number of selected people that had a controlling influence on the start of it. It will involve, primarily UK personnel without any real input of the USA, the major participant in the pursuit of this war. It is a tedious but necessary process and it is hoped that it will put to rest any number of observation on the veracity of information that was used as a bases for implementing a war. Whether it will ultimately satisfy people that a war was necessary and justified based on the ‘evidence’ of the time will continue to be open to debate.
Many of the key players are to have their day in the question seat some more than once and when required are allowed to give ‘evidence’ ‘in camera’ not open to any public hearing and therefore deemed to be of a secret nature as required of J. Scarlett, DG of MI6 2009. This possibility alone will be enough to keep open the debate; after having reviewed all information leading up to the war, what was the driving force behind the ultimate decision? Never the less there may not be any startling insights amongst the very carefully adjusted response themes to questions the panel will place on the hot seat.
Can there now be any doubt that the hyped statement of a 45 min launch window of WMD to land on the UK doorstep, which was the intended interpretation that was allowed to be placed before people as the reason to nail Saddam, had it any justification? Presumably no one now thinks that it was, if ever it was, wholly the case and never-mind any contra indication flowing from other expert sources.
There may have been other reason for the invasion; some believe it had much to do with long held plan of the American administration from bush senior to junior of unfinished business after the Kuwait invasion by Iraq and concern about stability in the region of oil resources. This may have been the American view with some evidence that there was an ongoing preparatory dialogue taking place which was given major stimulus, although diversionary, with the 9.11 attack. But this was not the UK point – it was more one of using the usual diplomatic channels via the UN and being aggressively proactive in the face of unsupportive and resistant EU members, a tack that was unsuccessful leading to the supportive passionate application of force alongside the US.
Not highlight in all the investigation of the persons concerned will be the 2 prime functions. (1) The belief driven view taken up by Blair to support the American mendacious view promoting a war and (2) The drive to be seen to be tackling the after effect of 9.11.01 and 7.7.05, compounding the misguided psychosis creation of a war on terror. Also it was important to be seen as a key player to the UK's most import ‘ally’ reliant on this constructed war on terror premise as it is expected that US support will be required in a future difficulty and on one were the UK will have to look to for succour when time become hard. It is this that is the ideological reason the UK succumbed to the worst political incompetence of modern times.
There are many questions that Chilcot will attempt to gain answer to within the remit of its terms of reference, this will of course exclude any subject it is not specifically allowed to look into or indeed pass a ‘judgment’ on, such as the legality of the war or to suggest any lies were constructed to deceive parliament. At a guess it will be shown that there was a process of a systemic creation of hubris to support an engendered view that some direct action for an unwarranted state of affairs, caused by Saddam, must be taken and this hubris was to find a way to create the dubious rational for action, no matter what, for doing it; ultimately inflicting an unnecessary and potential questionable illegal war onto Iraq.
For some the most startling piece of information to come out of the inquiry thus far, is not the miss-application of evidence, duplicity, hubris, cabinet cabal and neutered parliamentary assessment but something uniquely damaging to the UK. It may have been missed but the evident ‘theory driven belief’ systems that so guided Blair in his pursuit of inflicting war on Iraq is most amazing. From this belief came the near fervent apostolic conviction for him to judge without doubt and against advice or limited evidence that there was a direct immediate threat to the UK, or regions closer to Iraq that had much more to be worried about, is astonishing. This belief on its own was enough to carry his arguments forward and manipulate enough power to win over opposition. This action was presidential in style and gave him the use of the ‘royal prerogative’ an action that could be similar to tacit dictatorial power. However this is not a dictatorship so one person should not have the power to force a country to go to war, yet with his carful manipulation and clever disingenuous dialogue and the complicity of key parties together with acolytes in cabinet and a distinct lack of hard perusal of the evidence by parliament to launch an attack; war was made.
What Chilcot will not find is that the war was not an illegal one. That decision has already been made and will be allowed to remain vague for sovereign reason. It will not be challenged, for there are too many obstacles to overrule and more importantly by far, too much to risk to even suggest a counter legal view from such an inquiry that has no legal power. The future has an uncomfortable way of rewriting the past. Done too soon and it opens a massive problem – reparation for war crime, one the UK cannot afford to condone.
The report when it is published will without doubt highlight a massive failure in parliamentary proceeding, over excessive executive pressure and a culpable miss direction laid on and by the cabinet which was not questioned. There was a systemic failure to investigate information that had parliament done so would have made the affliction of a war at best unnecessary or worse possibly delayed it. Events would have, given Saddam’s Iraq pernicious ethos against its own people, eventually matured and created an alternative strategic necessity.
No doubt some people will be held critical, some process will be judge as deeply flawed, parliamentary process will have failed catastrophically, lives may have been lost unnecessary and some indicative evidence will not see the light of day. However there is a long term danger in this inquiry for the UK and it is a danger that will not affect the USA for it will not go through the same self flagellation over its mistakes as the UK. It is unlikely to ever have its own Chilcot inquiry. The danger will perhaps be on two counts. The UK in the eye of the EU and others will be open to having been willingly cohered into action by the need to be seen to keep a robust special relationship with the US and will have lost political creditability for a relationship that is one of subservience for very little reward or actual recognition. The other danger is more immediately tenuous and it is one related to the ability of the UK to ever respond to a threat unilaterally (ref Falklands) or in concert with others, against public and some political objection that will have become distrustful of politicians and wholly against participating in any other conflicts. Even if it wanted too, the process to gain agreement by parliament will in future be slow and tortuous, so much so that any urgency for immediate reaction will be lost and detrimental to minimal risk for armed forces. It is not difficult to see that in any future tension that could lead to conflict, the UK will step aside. In this event, will the prominent EU members step to the plate where it failed with former Yugoslavia etc?
© Renot 2010
2320100730
posted by Renot at 3:49 am
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