Monday, January 03, 2011

Delusion of Philosopy

Delusion of Philosophy.


Steven Hawkins of “A brief history of time” and Richard Dawkins “The god delusionist” both essentially hold the view that the usefulness and importance of philosophy is moribund. It is of far less importance than the discoveries and application of scientific functions with its ‘rigorous’ approach to proof of fact. They are taking their stance from the point that no new thinking on the state of human existence or consciousness has been acclaimed. Nor is it (philosophy) relevant to modern science and that it has cohered people into positions of belief and ideas that have no actual relevance to human existence when compared to the progress that has marked scientific advancement. Philosophy does not have any relevant content to form a conclusive function to existence and has only added to the discourse in the delusion of a perception of a godly aspect of human awareness. Such views, expressed most vehemently by Dawkins, also wrapped by religion, are strengthened with applied examination of it, by the scientific practice; ‘prove it’. It (philosophy) has little to offer in the face of provable evidence.

Now although these two individuals may represent an unquantifiable portion of people that may hold similar views, they are by no means totally representative of the vast majority of human kind. The evidence for this is in the strength of numbers in those holding of a ‘philosophical delusion’ as is manifest in the many religions, spiritual or esoteric studies. However, the large numbers of them that do hold a positive view of philosophy encompassed in religion or science, does not mean that it is on its own, useful. Some additional aspect must be bought to bear to give some credibility to the application of philosophy if it is to have a bearing on science or any other field of human quest.

Although natural science has made great strides in helping humans understand the complexity of the world, it has done so in incremental stages over a long period. Scientific processes is ponderous, it is a brick on brick movement that occasionally gets a mutation, a paradigm moment, that lifts understanding to move it forward to the next level of consideration This understanding though begins with the process of developing a hypotheses, gathering arguments to support the hypotheses and putting it to the test. This is often more by way of a practical application aided by technological packages. Such packages are designed and devised to be capable of replication, to test and pressure the accuracy or not of the hypotheses. In this examination, each element of the principles under which the hypotheses is framed is examined to verify the concluding result. Thereby proving or not the accuracy of the hypotheses and offering a new building block in the understanding of how things work. This scientific approach is one that calls for proof and one that can be independently qualified in order to eliminate any sources of prejudice in the construction of the method of examination.

There is a small weakness in the above scientific method and it has to do with the endeavour experts have gone through to achieve their status. Status that often has required them to becoming enmeshed in the principles behind their expertise to gain acceptance as an ‘expert’. For even though a new hypotheses may be framed, often by a new intellectual, or by existing ‘experts’, it is generally compartmentalised within the principles of their expertise and so the construction of the mechanism of proof could be done in such a way as to propagate an ‘expected’ outcome thereby generating proof of concept. Although this might be countered with the idea of peer review process, it is often corrupted by conflicting values that simple oppose the hypotheses (especially if it come from outside of the sphere of experts or from a different discipline) and it may also be subject to a degree of professional protection. Critical professional protection arises from those not willing to become attached to the hypotheses or expose their own professional standing if they support it, should the proof not be verified. Alternatively, even be concerned of their ‘expertise’ if the new hypotheses are proven true, to undermine their own discipline. As there can be great rewards in gaining personal recognition for scientific advancement, there is often a degree of collusion in scientific investigation and ideas can become rejected outright, accepted and unchallenged, generating a ‘mind lock’ for the proponents of the accepted norms of science. Some things are fact; laws of science are ‘laws’ and are not usually successfully challenged.

Disregarding this inbuilt possible propensity of hypotheses self-fulfilment formed around established principles, great store is put on the replication of a test by different associates, who may arrive at similar conclusion of proof. Thereby a new scientific fact is perhaps established. It is on this process of provability that science rest and this establishment of ‘fact’ is something that cannot be done with philosophic conjecture. It is from this perspective that philosophy seems to be suffering from some negatively by the scientific community in the contemporary shape of Hawkins and Dawkins.

However, the eradication of philosophy from the realm off scientific discourse is far from over and one needs to consider philosophy in its historic context and its drive within science. Philosophers have often tread a path in the pursuit of knowledge were science has been unwilling to go, for science often lacked the tools to test or replicate proof. As a starting point, it may be argued that philosophers were in the early days the only ‘scientist’, there was no distinction between those that sought knowledge from the philosophy of mathematics to the mapping of the periodic table and the stars.

Philosophic development was shaped by the likes of Pythagoras, Aristotle, Plato, Descartes et el. and their contributions to the development of science revolved around the rumination of mind structures that encompassed Metaphysics, Epistemology and Logic. These people and many others were the bedrock of current knowledge. It is via them and a process of concentrated thought to raise questions and test them under discussion, which formulated early scientific knowledge. It has been by this cogent process, generally without the aid of scientific tools that has generated the capacity to frame the ultimate question ‘I wonder?’….

The ability to reach this stage of inquiry required a conceptual process to take place in the mind. It may have only been initially a survival or emotive drive that shaped the need to form conceptual images and from this to making sounds into representation of reality. From this function, language was constructed and it was progressively codified for a usable language of accumulated words. With the sense and commonalty of understandable language that carried accepted meaning, it became possible to provide subsequent application of it to the studies in early science investigation. Philosophy so gained voice, exercising the mind in metal applications that allowed the continual development of conceptual thought. Without this conceptual thought process that may have been (and in some facet still is) temporarily limited by the lack of words used to frame questions, it relies ultimately on pressurising the language that is ‘universally’ acknowledged with meaning to force from conceptual thought a framed hypotheses.

Without language to describe concepts and give value to the expression of the concept itself, or of maths or functions applicable to science, science would not progress. Philosophical discourse allows humans to step outside the boundary constriction of science ‘facts’ and explore unreasonable concepts that science cannot prove and philosophy does not have to. It, philosophy, poses the problems for science to baulk against until perhaps it catches up. The practical factual examination of ideas in science relies on known facts: observation, application, testing and qualification. If the philosophical questions of the likes of how or why are stripped out of the progression of scientific investigation what motivates the drive to know more?

From this, one can assume that science still ultimately relies on the application of philosophy with the function of conceptual thought and as an example, some past possessors of it would be comparable to Galileo, Newton, Heisenberg, Planck, Bohr or Einstein. Without them, a few of the greatest proponents of philosophy in science, how would science look; if they were not able to think – I wonder…

So, is it no wonder that Hawkins and Dawkins do not achieve similar acclaim with their own delusions of philosophy?


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