UK; Enter the Indefinite.

Enter the Indefinite.

IN or OUT?

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Abstract

To simplify, can the UK survive outside of the EU? Of course it can but at what cost? Much has changed over the four decade of membership, for the UK and globally. The UK no longer has the mantle of cover provided by the commonwealth, it is no longer a world power, it has no predominate manufacturing base, no large world export earning position, (51% of UK total exports now go to Europe with just 9% being imported from Europe) no indigenous energy resource or control, wholly dependent on the service sectors which represent 79% of GDP with the finance sector running at a challenging 10%. It has become a low wage ‘flexible’ economy with the highest public and private borrowings. Its lauded GDP growth increase since the Credit Crises is driven by consumer spending! Interest rate is unrealistically low at 0.5% with deflation lurking and debt & deficit largely unmanageable made worst by propagated austerity. This strained referendum has little to do with providing the electorate with a greater control over sovereignty, or better life opportunity, security, and conditions for themselves: it is a device solely contrived by and for a number of MP’s, primarily of the conservative party, to press forward their own self interest and resentment of all things emanating from the EU and undo all economic, socially unifying laws. They want sovereign power at whatever cost to extract from being IN. None of this matters to those that want OUT and they have not made any attempt to define a better vision for the UK than simply being OUT and wholly sovereign. In the event that they gain their way the immediate response will be, if past experience shows, the money market will look at the above to assess how the UK in future years will pay its way?  The pound will be priced to sell, interest rate will be forced to rise; exports to Europe will be at risk. There will no avoiding the influencing element of EU policy that impinges on exports, ‘the city’ or the pressure and pull of immigration contagion. And of course there is no overwhelming reason for the remaining EU members to show or be magnanimous to aid the UK in transition, for far more imperative pressure are unfolding that threaten the very fabric of the great project and the stability of the whole of Europe.

On a local issue should the Out succeed driven by an English majority, there is little doubt that Scotland will sue for another dissolution referendum if the majority of Scots choose an IN for Europe. This will be the start of the breakup of the union after which it is likely Scotland will serious consider applying for some form of accession to the EU, one that probably will be accepted by the EU.   

The implication and difficulty such a move will cause, to redress the remains of the Union; will be far greater than the turmoil the government will face over its remaining term. There is a far stronger and quantifiable argument to remain IN than leap into an indefinite, exposed financial future.  

  

Sometime, probably, in late 2016, a simplistic question was put to the indifferent people of the UK, which will have a profound long term democratic representational effect and a terrible impact on the unsuspecting youthful generations to come. The current electorate will be polled in a forced highly contentious referendum that will gradually impose on the immediate generation a reality check on the importance of understanding the ill-formed deeds propagated by a few orchestrated prejudiced players. These people are intent on driving a narrow ‘debate’ on unfathomable, inappropriate questions, to secrete the real intentions being fought over, perpetrated by them (to get out of the EU) and in doing so will underestimate the opprobrium poured onto the probable future debacle they have initiated and which either way will shape a future that will have to pick up the social uncertainty and financial implications which will have to be accommodated as the ‘unintended’ consequences of the poll and the subsequent arguments being verbosely expressed around ‘BritEX’ toxically engaged in. No matter how the referendum is decided, the core of the issue is; does the UK (BritIN) stay in the EU or exit? A yes or no majority turn out is not going to be a ‘no’ change scenario for the UK.

                     

Where did the issue of this contestable poll come from? A constricted view may be made with reference to the post war period 1948 -1960. Countries of Europe agreed that there was a need to combine a range of function that would mitigate the political / social pressures, they thought, that led to the two very destructive wars of the 20^th century and by having a more unitary dialogue might dissuade any future destructive adventures. Steps were taken to move gradually to a loose unification of political and economic issues for west European countries.

However the political incompetence of the UK was insularly mind locked into avoiding supranational links with historic enemies and remained outside of the development of the 1951 ECSC start and the subsequent EEC in 1957. This intransigence of the UK prevailed up to the 1960 when it became clear that UK was in a declining economic mode and the government of the day under the conservative McMillan in 1961 applied to become a member of the EEC. After a number of unsuccessful attempts by the governments of the conservative and labour party to join with EEC, which was adamantly blocked by the hostile French Charles de Gaulle; it eventually gained membership in 1973 steered through by the conservative E. Heath. However there was a continuing political discord within the party systems on the terms agreed on membership. With the developing supranational control affecting UK policies and historic resentment towards Europe, a referendum was put in place in 1975 by the labour Prime Minister H. Wilson. It was not a ‘in / out’ poll but related to the terms on offer. The outcome was a 60+% in favour of staying a part of the ‘great project’

It is probably true to say that at that poll time, most people had little idea of what the EEC was about but on the basis of historic memory, the state of the UK industry, economy, ancestral politics and a unspecific desire for a change; support to be a part of a new vision for something greater than the diminishing empire and commonwealth had a immense influence on the ‘in’ decision; and in doing so resisting the hard core ejective elements of the establishments preference for maintaining insular political control. Since 1975 there has been a consistent mendacious tension between different factions of politicians against the EU playing the loss of sovereignty, administration malfeasance, EEC’s unaccountable nature, cost and dysfunctional element of the EEC; together with socialist laws and powers, such ‘problems’ for intolerant Politicians and commercial interest which they would rather not have had. Each time a new treaty was agreed to strengthen the EU foundation and closer relations, factions expressed negativity and questioned the holding too the validity of the 1973 act of accession.

Over time it was seen that that there has been for the economy and the population major benefits. The country prospered, investment came in. It fortuitously gained its own energy wealth (oil/gas) moved from a manufacture export dependent economy to a service / commercial financial one and from the advantage of a being a big player in the EEC markets, maintained a measure of global importance but the conjoined association was not a no risk no commitment arrangement, it required vision, a sense of purpose and constructive obligation that unfortunately elements of all UK parties failed to adhere to. Although the UK avoided some of the debatable aspects of the EEC direction like shengen and the Euro monetary union, it failed disastrously on the management of its own links with the EMS/ERM (European Monetary System & Exchange Rate Mechanism) created in 1979 which the UK joined in 1990 with an overpriced currency and was subsequently forced out in 1992 by the volatile aggression of the currency market that bet against the strength of the pound in the face of the growing weakness of the UK economy.

The succession of governments have over this time also seriously underestimated the impact of EU expansion from the original 6 broadly compatible founding members in 1951, increased to 10 at 1981 and now potentially 29 (28 Current) countries with widely different social and economic resources stability. It also ignored completely the unrestrained migration / immigration creep of porous borders that schengen would open. The European commission as a body and individual states tended to forgo any of their supranational development competence and sunk into a laisez faire hubris of a Commission driven for idealism without any need to be truly accountable due in some respect to a miss-calculation of the overall benefit of pursuing the European ‘great project’ without actively participating in a consolidation construction of the EEC in regards to its originating foundation. This blind enthusiastic over-optimism led to the eventual rushed enlargement of the EU, not anticipating the destabilising impact such rapid expansion would cause exposing the probable, now obvious, incompatible economic standing between founding states and the more recent members of the EU with divergence on key policy issues that primarily effect the euro economic stability, impact on social order, immigration / migration, EU border security and external supranational pressures.         

So for the past 40 years the minor festering individual elements of the UK political establishment have displayed a uncertainty of commitment in the closer association with EU. They have intermittently raised the antipathy level against, as they see it, the interfering overarching direction being imposed upon parliamentary supremacy and all that the enlarged EU represents, with occasionally false representation in the media of EU laws and directives being passed that ‘unduly’ affect and override UK derived law. It has been an incessant spread of misinformation and dissent not robustly challenged by government and crucially over all that time the presumed opposition to Europe did not have any real public drive for change. Although there was never any grounds swell of public opinion that could lead one to think that there was a call for questioning the continuation of UK membership of the EU, it was and still is a manipulation by political placed dissenters that has hyped the pressure for an exit and little may have come of their disingenuous antics until recently.

A number of things have developed to allow the repudiation trend to develop; the Credit Crisis with its offspring austerity; the near collapse of the euro; Islamic extremism; the high volume of uncontrolled immigration, with its undeniable effect on changed cultural density in some areas; their take up of low skill employment and the eventual cost suppression of ‘cheap disposable labour’ on available jobs. However the most influential drive to move for a challenge, could be said to be; had the Scottish referendum been lost to a dissolution vote it is unlikely that the conservative government would have been too enthusiastic to deliver a EU poll however with the small majority that the Cameron government had and his lack of control over his own MP’s in parliament on the issue of Europe. He was forced into the wholly unnecessary situation of pandering to the hard core anti-euro sceptics. He continually teased them with a referendum to keep them on song, which he now has to deliver. It is one of the most disgraceful pieces of political mendacious machination that now requires him to scamper around the whole of Europe to gain diffident support for another round of ‘opt outs’ that he can offer to the public and EU sceptics as a reason to stay with the EU. The indication today are pointing to a singularity of purpose driven by a number of conservative MP “bastards” as J. Major revealed  (approx 84) and a few from other parties together with powerful external lobby groups bent on achieving a measure of control, influence and power for themselves and business cronies; wrapped into hyperbole verbosity of re-gaining national sovereign choice.

It is inconceivable that the whole of the EU members will voluntarily acquiescence completely with to Cameron’s demands outright. Some of them are unwilling to unravel the financial benefits that their country wo-men are gaining by working in the UK, some have become infuriated over the years with the UK’s consistent belligerent stance taken against the EU project and the risk this IN/OUT referendum represents to the EU. Some are concerned that by giving way it weakens their position economically while allowing the UK to benefit without ongoing unity commitment. No country has thus far pursued for an exit precedent from the EU and for the UK, solely for unmitigated political desires, to engage in this unfolding debacle, has seriously exposed the inherent divisiveness at the heart of elements of the great project. So Cameron has been left in no doubt that this action is seen as extremely dangerous for the peaceful unity security of Europe and if he is unsuccessful in achieving an IN decision, the repercussions for the UK will be very perilous.     

The limited scope of the inducement that will be obtainable from the EU members are somewhat meaningless to the majority of the UK population yet they will be expressed as a real substantive change to a new relationship with the EU and will most likely be concomitant to border control, tougher immigration and implementation of financial disincentive to stop the immigration / migrant “draw factor”, some UK law supremacy over EU law, no “ever closer union”, trade and financial safeguards; essentially selective sovereignty.

A minority of the populace attendant to the MP’s exultations will want the decisions to go their way, their way being out of the EU no matter what the implications are; another minority will want to remain in the EU with or without any beneficial changes to the UK’s position and a majority will not give a great deal of thought to the imperatives but will vote to express an opinion based on their own bias. It is a high probability that this later bulk will exercise an out vote as a way of demonstrating political dissent against the history of recent government actions.

As a United Kingdom poll, the separate element of the union will clearly have an incendiary impact on the overall turn out number and direction. For these three nations; Scotland, Wales & N Ireland the benefit of being within the EU has been largely fortuitous yet profitable as recipients of substantial funding albeit via the manoeuvrings of governments since joining. It is likely that these three with their favourable view will agree to remain IN the EU, and this stance will also be because they have not, in any great number, suffered from the affect of overwhelming immigration and have not had to carry the cost nor social disturbance experiences in England.    

The demographic issue from the accession treaty in 1972 (signed in 73) to 1975 referendum has changed. Any eighteen plus year old allowed to vote then will be now 59 +years, 41 yrs after the event and will have known the Europe engagement with free movement, no border passport check, no cash transfer restriction, improved employment, holidays and social security, legal safeguards; benefiting from the Human Rights Act 1998 and the much maligned European Social Chapter 1961; even with the UK four ‘opt-outs’, etc elements of which some MP’s detest. They will have known little else but the benefits and the indirect cost of the EU membership but the greatest negative ongoing tangible impact they will have noticed will be uncontested immigration. This age band is most likely to consider an OUT option just on this basis alone. In comparison, anyone born after 1998 will know little or nothing of the chaos of the exchange controls, interest rate fluctuations, currency market trading wars, people movement & holiday money travel restrictions, trading tariffs, fluctuation high interest rates to curb inflation and protect the value of the pound to offset inequitable import vs. exports nor the desperate financial state that the UK was falling into prior to accession. They are more likely to have a relaxed and positive view to Europe and take the IN option even though their future stakeholder tenure to the UK is overall less tenable, with say, in job prospects, income opportunities, social security, prosperity, and their pensionable outlook has been made less favourable with the drive for “ever flexible labour market” as the UK become the sweat shop of the service sector compared to Europe.

On considering the evidence thus far and consulting the runes, the balance of probability would, to me, seem to indicate that England will throw an OUT vote but it will be countered by the IN vote thrown by Scotland, Wales & N Ireland. The overall majority for IN, from these three may well be small against the much larger population of England but it will be enough to nail a conclusion. However the euro sceptic will not give up and will require severe demonstrable authority to quell them. Such executive control is something Cameron has not established in allowing some ministers to run unhindered briefs detrimental too key public services, culminating in this massive destabilising, high risk, unwarranted contest.

A majority IN decision for the UK will be the best that the UK can hope for. It should be, with or without whatever additional ‘benefits’ are gained, mark the beginning of a new and better responsible engagement with the EU leading to a much stronger role in shaping policies and tackling unfolding threats. However the OUT decision cannot be ignored. It has so many implication that it is impossible to define which of the issues that such a decision, if it is taken will fire off. It is easier to look to the positives of an IN than contemplate the mess rolling into decades an OUT will cause.

By the end of summertime 2017, the UK will have taken an ambiguous step to an indefinite position, a place of uncertainty, high risk. This poll is not, as stated above, a no change scenario no matter what the outcome is. To question an IN choice, there is far too much that is quantifiable and at stake to eject the EU. With an OUT choice, there too little proven recompense for a rejection. Instead looking at the current government planned actions and the UK being outside the EU, will lead to dismantling a range of legal, social, employment arrangements, trade uncertainty and diminished world authority that one can see steps towards an elected dictatorial administration, and instability. Not capable of stopping a self inflicted form of creeping perdition. Should that happen, the impoverished UK will need an Acheson / Marshall Plan and is unlikely to be able look too or afford it from Europe or USA.

© Renot

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