The Economy of the Mad House

The Economy of the Mad House.

Hindsight.
The current debate on the cost and affordability of houses in the UK is taking much of the news space over the past decade. It is as if this is something new and deserves special attention for its endemic originality value rather than considering the possibility that the story is one that has been read before. It is often overlooked that this special nature of today’s housing problem has not always been the case and that the reasons for the change in the ‘perception’ of this new problem has more to do with the change in economic expectations and the manipulations of the market by political and private intervention than any natural intrinsic developments. It is instructive to view some elements of the past housing scene to perhaps understand why there is a problem today and perhaps extract some pointers as to where the problem is going or how to resolve it.

Pre wars the main housing provider was the private sector, in the guise of wealthy individuals or groups extracting a good return from a growing population needing to be housed. A small number of local corporations throughout the UK also built for distressed shortage and for the poorer people of their area, albeit that there was often a conflict of interest between the public and private view of housing provision. The private speculative builder considered the other of upsetting the market in competing, restricting rental income, taxation (1st war act) and the provision of cheaper houses potentially diluting the market opportunities, whilst, with a certain degree of dichotomy, the public sector viewing the other as operating in profiteering, exploitative, low investment and operating self imposed restrictive building practices. From the 1800’ there was ample evidence that housing needs were not being meet and that the appalling conditions in the quality of houses and hygiene contributed to the growing social unrest. Even though with the wide class divide and growing problems, landowners largely dictated the terms and arranged action to safeguard their peculiar interest while little was done to improve the declining state of the bulk of dwellings. By early 1900’s the house building activities of the private investor was in decline driven to some extent by the lack of a desire to continue investment in the face of social movements and in the perceived need to have to address the distressed improvement to housing conditions. This was a trend that was contributing to an increased lack of new property development, which no longer derived the previous generous economic returns. This decline in availability of good dwellings was not helped by local councils that were ambivalent in their attitude to the social provision of dwellings that would require them moving into others (private) house building areas. This stance was coloured by a degree of vested interest of ‘city fathers’ and the attention paid to the philosophical attitude of the deserving rich vs. subsidising the deserving poor. Over the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, there was noticeable exception in the apathy of private investment and innovative developers were later applauded for their creativity with developments like Bournville, Welwyn garden city, Port sunlight, Saltaire et al but not enough to make a step difference in supply, or convince the authorities to change their lethargic stance against the derisive interpretation in the term of the provision of ‘social housing’.

It was clear that the situation of diminishing housing ability would lead to increasingly serious problems and the difficulties were highlight more profoundly after the two wars with the destruction of property, diminished material resources, and returning forces manpower; after fighting the ‘war to end wars’ and looking to have a ‘homes fit for heroes’. No real long-term strategic house building action took place, the problem was fudge, slums where in every urban area but some local authorities did eventually capitulate and were forced to take a stake in the house creation requirement.



The capacity in development of the housing scene in the late 40’s was undoubtedly damaged as a result of two wars. Property was mainly rented and people could move from one areas to another (mainly in search of work) and perhaps get on the council housing list via a disagreeable points system or fall into a private facility. Most working class people tended to rely on the ‘corporation’ to house them. Out of preference, if the choice was available people generally lived close to work areas with very little requirement to travel too far to a work place. The majority of travel was by public transport, private transport was the province of the rich and a small sector of the “professional middle to upper classes”.

This state of affairs continued for 3 decades, with housing occasionally being given some development attention for politically expediency reasons that occasionally recognised that there was a shortage in housing as the population continued to expanded. At this stage (up to late 60’s) housing was somewhere to live close to a working opportunity and there was much evidence of poor housing stock, large areas of housing shortages (in some cases desperate) to, in some affluent areas, a shortage of choice. With the growing increase in population came the expansion of high density of occupation, this eased the pressure but very little comprehensively was done to improve the overall housing stock by either the corporations or the private sector.

Occupation of property fell into renting, tithed, mortgaged or private ownership. Renting property was for working class people; it was comparably economical compared with a wage income that was often derived from a sole source, with the male usually being the only family ‘bread winner’. The choice and quality of housing was controlled by the ability to pay and as wages were low the choice and clear demand for alternatives was not evident, albeit with the housing stock of many local authorities in dubious condition and private holdings were little more than rat infested hovels highlighted occasionally by rent racketeers. With large and extended families, often squeezed into overcrowded accommodation, the chance of easing the situation rest on two factors, getting sufficient points for a larger council house or having the ability to pay high rent to go private, neither of which was easy. As the council allocation of what was available was done on a mean points system, if enough points accrued the chance of getting a house increased but generally there was a long waiting list.

In the period 40/60s there was not a great deal of independent people mobility to get to jobs and the subsequent demand for house mobility was low. The ability to buy property was not the general purview of most working people, (a) it was not a life style choice, (b) they could not afford to buy and rents were economical with a single working income, (c) there was little inspirational impetus. Remember it was normal for just the male to be the sole ‘bread winner’ in a household, in addition major movement of people having to travel large distances to gain work was not normal and in this context mass travel was still largely the domain of public transport.

Although there were housing difficulties, with area shortages, opportunistic landlords, old non-maintained public and private stock, and credit restrictions, there was an element of stability that did not exhibit signs of the later market panic nor did it unbalance the nature of the UK economy.

This fortuitous ‘static’ situation dramatically changed with the development of the re-constructive policy design of government. The late 50s/60’s saw the beginning of large-scale foreign investment assisted with generous government grants. This resulted in jobs and investments that where being pushed into ‘deserving’ areas. With this investment shifts; the government took the step of developing a housing programme and establishing new towns. For the first time recognising the economic affect of the shortage of quality housing, the need to meet the effects of the ‘post war baby boomers’ and having labour located where the investments was being placed. This was becoming both a political ‘hot potato’ and also holding back structural development in the heartland of the UK having suffered as a result of the post war austerity. Social Houses were built around the new manufacturing zones and from that point on, in general, prosperity increased. Private housing development was limited and formed perhaps no more that 25% of new housing stock but this also was to change.

The younger generation of the 60s gained the explosion on all front of a more relaxed open society that had higher expectations than their parents and took advantage of the marketing hype aimed at their ‘disposable’ income. Higher expectation translated into an ability to afford consumables that started to explode onto the market and during the 60s and 70 two of the prime (and continuing) consumables became houses and cars. A growing population had to be housed and mobility was becoming an issue, both of which, houses and transport, were not being meet by concerted state investment. Of course there was some attempt fill gaps but restrictions placed on all public sectors by the government as a means of controlling the PSBR meant that not enough was being invested in either area.

In part the solution was to encourage the private sector to build houses for sale to the new affluent young and promote the ideal of a home of one own outside of the need to rent. It was seen as a statement of being of substance – it made long term sense but buying a house was looked upon primarily as a place to live, not as an investment tool, that idea only come later. These new houses where built on green field out of town sites as it was seen as quicker, cheaper and more ‘desirable’ but they often had no original infrastructure and no established easy access. Fortunately the access / transport issue to these ‘new towns’ was mitigate by the greater use of private vehicles and road building, this was seen as the way of the future with a consequential reduction of public transport in rail (Beeching + privatization) and bus (privatisation). However the social housing content continued to be under pressure through the lack of resources once the initial relocation investments for new manufacturing and service employment ran its course. Maintenance after the boom in social housing was undermined creating another future problem.

Problem.
So given the housing trials of today what went wrong?
Initially nothing, the 60s saw the beginning of the end of the residue effect of having come out of a war with a bust economy, little private technological investment and no modern heavy manufacturing capacity. It saw the beginning of new opportunities derived from foreign investment with an expansion of the European market and an element of confidence in the future – excluding the pernicious nature of the cold war.

By the late 70s, a new dogma was created and all objective rationality went by the way. Political ideology took over with manufacturing seen not to be the way forward – the service sector was to become dominant and incorporated the privatisation of public interest. There was no transport policy other than to build (under duress) roads and the private sector could do heaven and all and no wrong.

Into the melee of the late 70/ 80s came one of the biggest and long lasting political blunders of all time but at the same time a piece of vote stealing, engineered, gerrymandering genius. This more than any other act of economic restructuring created the seed of our current crises. ‘The right to buy’ For the aspiring working class, that might never have moved onto home ownership and extensive debt, it was seen as a way of building something for themselves and their children, a way of getting off the treadmill of paying rent for ever, and avoid being homeless or falling in the hands a ‘Rackman’ type landlord. It was a great success. The ethos of council house provision was killed off at the same time to be replaced by forced housing stock transfers and un-elected housing association trust.




Despite the evidence of a market overheating the disposal programme continued through the 90’s to today, with over 2m council dwellings now owner occupied and 100 LA’s transferring their entire housing stock to housing association (HA’s), producing for some areas a labour mobility lock out.

In short the flexibility of renting property at a reasonable rent and having the flexibility of home mobility to relocate to a job, became untenable for the less than average wage earner.

The crisis in housing shortage has been developing for some time and could in general be split into areas of demand matched by their economy strengths and those apposing areas of lower economic strength. The result now is that overall there is no housing strategy and supply is not keeping pace with demand. It is not and never has been in the private sectors interest to fill demand; it is scarcity that generates higher sale value (profits) and fast fluid sales (low void time). The recent BARKER REPORT by the Bank Of England covered some elements of the problem but avoided making any real pronouncement other than to support the building trade view that an easement off and faster planning permissions was the problematic issue to be resolved, with a low reference to a call for more social housing.

It identified the obvious demand for new houses but did nothing to point to a strategy, which is little wonder as there has always been an uncomfortable contentious role for government in its enforced role of social housing provider. However it is an issue that requires urgent attention. The problem is by whom, at what level, at what cost and to whom. It is estimated that 140,000 new homes are required for each year for over the next ten years to catch up with the past short fall and cope for expansion. It is a huge direct financial cost excluding the infrastructure cost to fall on the public purse; no doubt it is a cost any government would again want to avoid. For the public purse, the cost of subsidising social housing and the actual provision of social housing has always been in a ideological tension since the poor laws of 14th centaury leading to the role of hospitals (not as known today) alms houses, work houses and private suppliers.

Demand effect.
What is driving this demand? The UK is a small island, with a large population, it is a competitively wealthy place (4th in the world and slipping fast), and the population has become by and large affluent, pliant, law abiding and does not portray the inclination of a backward third world corrupt despotic country and is secure. It has been continually affected by the game of supply and demand – demand is evident the supply is not, even though it is clearly in the country’s interest to respond to the demand.
With an estimate of some +£50bn going into ’buy to let’ since 1996, and the fabulous manipulation of huge borrowings to buy property, the economy has become eschewed from ‘normal’ investment property prudence. In addition the apparent success in stabilising inflation, stock market collapse and the move to low interest rates feeds the need to gain inflation or interest proof investment returns and to help fuel a pension pot. The increase demand for home ownership is a comparably recent development, not matched by any other European experience that shows anywhere near the same growth in owner-occupiers or the dramatic raise in property values.

It has also been suggested that expanded immigration is adding to the demand and fueling shortage, by taken up council property or public funding of private locations in some areas, however the emphasis in shortages and demand is placed more on demographic shifts with increased preference for sole home occupiers by affluent young, the trend for detached dwellings and not enough investment in high density dwelling.
Adding to the problem is the accumulation of restrictive land banks by developers that hold back land to massage demand for maximum profit and cherry picking green field sites in preference to reusable land. As well as the usual supply / demand game, the governments must also be largely to blame with its historic, apathetic and gerrymandering indifference to putting in place a rolling strategy that can mitigate the housing crisis. All evidenced by diminishing new building outturns.

A house is no longer seen just as a place to live in and be a part of a community but as an investment hedge. This attitude is supported with property values increasing at a rate of 10 or 20+% and when the profiteering take in new build is considered, with the end value exceeding cost by in some 100%; it creates investment returns too good to miss and pushes up the price of a house and impacts exiting stock.

The enduring lack of forceful action to moderate demand provides strength to the continuing ‘demand’ impetus. The economic shifts of recent years – with the demise of manufactures in the old production areas and the burgeoning independent economy of the south, simple exacerbates the problem as the affluent buy up the market and helps feed the buy to let scenario.

Unfortunately what is developing now is a new segregation of society into those that have and can afford and those that have not and can’t, generally focusing on the slow impoverishment of the working class which I define by everyone that has to earn a living but do not have excessive disposable income i.e. just enough money that covers their living cost with a little over. That the rich do get richer and the poor slip further down the comparative poor scale, has been demonstrated on a number of occasions and on just one measure alone, such as the tax take burden, it has decreased for the wealthy and increased for the less well off over the past 20 years. This must also provide some scope for much higher disposable income for some at the higher end of the pay scales to fuel the boom in house cost.

Resolution.
There is an argument that says that once the demand for the cheaper end of the market is squeezed or depressed out (say -£125K), or that the middle ground gets stuck (say -£500K) due to prices moving beyond the ability of the less well off to afford to buy, that the market will stabilise and prices drop to marketable levels as sellers get pressed, this will allow the lower end buyer to catch up. This is also linked to the effect of a slow raise in inflation and higher wages that will over time move the lower end of the frustrated buying market, back into a marketable position at the time when the housing market bottoms out, assisted by prospect of higher interest rates. This is a ridiculous position to take and it does nothing to solve the market shortage. To hope this will correct the runaway explosion and financial benefit of house ownership will not resolve the underlying problem which is that there are not enough homes to satisfy demand to rent or buy. It is our old fiend of supply and demand that will continue to drive the economic desirability of property ownership.

The population is diversifying, is shifting north to south, is increasing, wants a financial safety net and is wedded to the idea of property ownership as security as well as it being considered cheaper to buy than rent. So the market will not correct its-self for the foreseeable future, there is and has been an acknowledge shortage of houses that needs immediate and strong action to re-balance the ‘market’ now.

Contributing to a solution to the endemic housing problem we may consider the following options.
Recognise that housing is strategic requirement that demands a controlling authority to be established to monitor the ‘market’ and manage availability.

HA’s should be taken back into direct public accountable ownership under an overall controlling body.

Repeal the right to buy legislation, or at best make it only available to residing council tenants that build up continuance of tenancy of say a minimum of 10 years.

Allow council to retain all of the income generated by a property sale to invest in building more council houses. Local Authorities are generally more in tune with local demand and have a vested interest to respond to shortages. A managed coordinated developer may also generate more competition.

Allow La to build houses for selective rent or sale on brown field sites as they can provide houses at a cheaper rate than the private sector.

Build houses and flats for rent only with FRI (full repair and insure) in key areas, at affordable rent under say a ‘in perpetuity trust’ for key worker – a bit like tithe houses.

Offer to provide council property new or old at a rent rate that is cheaper than it is to buy (or normally rent) providing the tenant takes on provable FRI. This might appeal to a working family if they are given a life interest in the property that can be transferred to an immediate relative. Alternatively the rent might also be racked down as the ‘pay back’ point is reached subject to a checked FRI.

Tax property speculators for holding onto land that has acquired permission for house build, or land that is being held beyond a reasonable period, which has been approved or released for build, this will force them to develop it quicker or be faced with forcing up the price of houses they build beyond a viable level.

Restrict development of housing on green field sites unless fulfilling a specific purpose i.e. key local worker housing, local long-term residency, aiding local economy development. The house should also tie to a local job and held in a trust.

Double the rate of council tax on second homes.

Tax house profit on a sliding scale from 20% to zero on the sale of property on the overall unearned profit gained over a 10 years period, on top of stamp duty. This should help dampen the demand for home ownership as a fast investment tool. i.e. a house sold in the first year of ownership is hit with a notional 20% tax on the ‘profit’ so it is better to be a long-term householder and avoid all the tax than be a short-term buyer/ seller speculator.

Reclaim the VAT benefit on own build houses if sold within 5 years.

Force lenders to be much more vigorous and diligent in the way they lend, far too many people are able to take on debt that they should not prudently be able to afford based on income. False self-certification should carry a penalty on the lender and borrower.

The continuing independent booming economy of the south needs to be deflated and the only way this can be done is to force public and some private investment into the northern counties and the further north the better.


(Some element of the above are now under consideration)




Finally, one aspect of house ownership, particularly with those that have been persuaded to do a right to buy, is that they will be faced with a potential inability to maintain a property once their earnings drop in retirement. We may see a return to large blocks of slowly degrading house condition like the 1900’s and with some pensions bombing out there is no reason to suppose that the current affluent private sector buyer will not be caught in a similar predicament.

It is madness to see the inordinate way that house / property values affect the working of our economy that then requires and in some way dictate corrective shifts in interest rates, which have such inordinate effect on the boom to bust market. Interest rates should be only used as a tool to assist the macro economy of the UK in the export of manufacturing and service provision. While we remain outside the Euro we have freedom to do this and we can play this mad balancing game but then as there are no mad houses any more, maybe there is no problem.

Renot 4.7.04

How to win a war.

How to win a war.

Is a war winnable?

What is meant by war? War is a way of describing a situation were all of a country’s resources are applied under a structured guidance system to meet and match an opposing ‘enemy’. In this case it must also mean that there is some form of dispute that is not resolvable other than the by the use of force and that the opponents are of perhaps equal strength, similarly guided and with focused determination.
The old way of fighting a war was to throw people at the task to kill one another until one has superiority over the other and one gives in. This can lead to a period of peace but if the winner does not allow for magnanimous independence and progress, the issue will break out again.
What wars have been over, at least in the past, has been varied from resources gain ability, political manipulations, dictatorial direction and religious ideology. These wars have been carried out with the deliberate intention of destroying as far as possible the ability of the opponent to disagree with the others actions or to stop them pursuing their own objectives, ultimately to win the war and disputed arguments by any means.

The ferocity of such past wars has been ‘limited’ by the tools available and latterly by a conduct code of war as in the ‘Geneva Convention’. It has not stopped wars or conflicts but has resulted in opposing party’s holding dialogue and in non participants pressing for cessation of the aggression. This attempt to control the organisation of war is a result of the two WW’s that generally resulted in the structured halt to conflict and reparation being made for the ‘victors’. This sort of war if carried out by organised controlled states can be brought to a managed end and despite the bitterness that may remain; some form of reconstruction and dialogue can commence which has shown to be the better way to avoid any further violent extremes. This is only possible between states that have strong internal organised civil, state structure and institutions to which most people recognise as being the legitimate representation of the majority of the population, as perhaps in a democracy or similar accepted authorertive structure.

The past way of war infection could be seen as a stand up fight over what might be, to each party, a clear point; over land, asset, principle, etc. Now in the 21st century it is more likely to occur over diminishing resources, economic ideology control or race.

Past wars of recent history may be seen as the last of the traditional confrontational wars. The 1st WW was the last one were manpower was thrown at the enemy until the superiority of resource and man power waste took its toll. The unsatisfactory conclusion may have laid the foundation of the next. The 2ndWW showed a shift in the use of resources with mechanisation paying a greater part in the end result yet pointed to new factors at play in war; the organised targeted slaughter of a selected people, structures and the new considerably greater measure of destructive ability.

In some ways this indicated the way a future war could be fought, by the use of hugely destructive weapons and the smart select ability of targets. The flaw of this type of possible war was that the destruction removed any chance of asset gain and potentially resulted in one party being decimated to the extent that it could no longer carry forward its re-organised plans and is forced to concede practical active defeat. With very little chance of generational reconstruction or reconciliation after a war of this nature, the population of both antagonists would likely be severely disabled; the after effect would linger on for tens of generations. This was the MAD scenario that some suggest kept the west at peace. This though does not offer any clue as to how a future war may really be fought or how it could turn out, in practice it does show that the clear destructive capability gives raise to some measure of restraint and preference of jaw jaw. However this is only possible between parties that see the economic asset waste and futility of war and are prepare to concede to joint mediation. It is part of the tension that hold western counties back from the brink and it does stimulate reluctance to participate in others disputes.

The recent conflicts such as in Yugoslavia / Balkans, Africa (Rwanda, Congo, etc) and Middle East, are not I suggest true wars as they are fought by internal factions. They are not all out country wars, are not of equal combatable standard and do not trouble the west economically too much. Perhaps because of the lack of direct economical collateral damage to the west, Europe, Asia and the USA have not actively forcefully participate in stopping them before they got out of control, hence the reoccurrences of genocide!

War as indicated above, is perhaps two sides of opposing ideas fighting over an issue generally for material gain and they are or should be of comparable strength. The application of unequal aggressive strength is not a war, it is a conflict that could be seen to be an imposition of force by one country over another for reason not linked to any direct gain or act of overt aggression rather like as has occurred and inflicted on Iraq and the continuing obscenity of the Middle East.
What these conflicts do show as a precursor to any war, is the true potential amorphous uncontrollability of the next war, its unpredictability with the different involvement of unresponsive factions and indicates just how any future war could be fought, lost or won.

Any future war will cost. The financial and structural damage that could occur can cripple a healthy culture and the victor may not have the strength or resource to either rebuild, asset strip the opponent or stave off another challenge, spun off from a different conflict.

To the question can a war be won? Well yes it can in the short term on two fronts.

1. A complete destruction of assets, people etc. Win by the complete annihilate of the whole of the opponents structure and society – everything. This is the cheap option.

2. A measured controlled action by both parties that must be prepared to mediate to a solution and thrive by consolidated absorption with shared amalgamation where one power may naturally supersede another over time yet maintain an element of cultural identity. The price and effort required though is huge. Unfortunately in disputes, reason only supersedes when ideology is killed off, ideology will leap into the abyss of war and reason may pull away.

Practically though with point 1, a total annihilation of an enemy will forever be a torment in the global knowledge, in that the ‘victor’ eradicated a whole culture. This knowledge will form a silhouette in time and the victor will be made to suffer at some future point as other cultures develop and become capable of a challenge. To forestall such a challenge the victor has to be locked into a supreme military capacity for as long as they are reliant on external resources and there are competing cultures. As no civilisation has managed yet to be wholly self sustaining or self replicating, this in the long term is not a feasible outcome. In this situation it is most unlikely that the superior force would want to utilise resources to achieve economic compatibility to break out of such self defeating spiral.

With point 2, the challenge is to reach a state of equanimity whereby reason overrides material, political and emotive divides so that each can measure the losses they could have in war as against the joint benefits with peace. To this end they have to develop a shared strategy to meld a common co-operative in all things as in the current nascent EC. The logical extension of this is that this system can only really work and be successful in the long term by being inclusive to as many cultures willing to co operate as a single entity to the extent required to be as near self sustaining as possible. This will also mean market forces can no longer rule.
Clearly on a global scale there will be countries that are not capable of geographically participating in such an entity, economically or politically until they see mutual benefit or are nurtured into compatible position. This state of co operative existence in the long term has to include the whole world, for in just having a few separate power blocks, disconnected from each other, that do not coexist, they cannot avoid sociological and cultural divergence over time (even if they can all become self sustaining) ultimately leading to conflict and war.

The best way to win a war is to win before the shooting starts. This means a need to foresee likely events / stress lines that could have an impact on county’s interest and aim to avoid being in the weak dependence position. The west has come to rely too much on external resources; this is a major stress point. Therefore it must use resources to become self sufficient. This is a useful dynamic to adopt before the stress point reaches a war point. An alternative view could be to either have no impact or interest in the opposite culture, (isolationist) this can only work if self-sufficiency is in play. Or be prepared to participate in ameliorating their difficulties that may give rise to conflict. A short term tack is to have a position of strength that is unassailable; this might be economically or military but used to direct constructive consolidation of mutual benefit. This initial superiority of one civilization though, again is not sustainable without absolute control of everything, unlikely in any market economy.

If in a war situation, attention has to be given, even though it is premature in not knowing the final outcome, to the after effects. It is not possible to eradicate the stain of war, the knowledge of it and what happened will eventually win out. It is therefore important to fight it with a constructive end result in mind and this will involve engaging the opponents population with some level of historical and real time incontestable openness on why major target were destroyed, why productive capacity is eliminated and own up to mistakes. In this age of deceptive spin it will be hard to separate misinformation from truth so do not use euphemisms, do not target prime social structure and make it clear that this is a deliberate avoidance measure and were possible provide sustenance even in war to the opponents population.

This does not mean that aggressive force cannot be used nor that psychological opportunities can not be exploited but it has to be reasoned and truthfully explainable during and most certainly after the event.

In being involved in a controlled war if one side has the upper hand and can insert stabilising control, it may be possible to keep the communications network of the authority’s structure in place to maintain civil structures. On cessation, this has to lead to investment and rebuilding, however much greater attention has to be given to the needs of the civilian population and it has to occur immediately on cessation of war, it must be highly visible, wide spread and persistent. In doing this it should be possible to develop a governing shield to allow a strategic timely withdrawal into the background and still effect the direction of reconstruction. This is important if the victor requires access to natural resources. Currently in a global market it does not matter who owns resources the issue is getting the use of them and providing the resource flow, so at some stage they will reach the required consumer.

War between two governed cultures can be terminated but the future of ‘conflicts’ and their resolvability is more complicated. Leaving aside the usual precursors to wars what is interesting now is the way conflict arises and can escalate.

Increasingly pressure over resources is acting as a driver to conflict. Although it is disguised under the affect of religion, race, and political cultural perception it does show that there is an increasing tendency for a fragmentation of power in all cultures with the proliferation of weapons in and too uncontrolled areas. To the west this is notable in 3rd world and Middle East cultures hence the coercions for democracy to nullify such fragmentation, unfortunately democracy cannot work without historic social affiliation. This is where point 2 comes into play.

What is overlooked is the same fragmentation of power is taking place in the west. It may seem that there is a balance of democratic power and equanimity however the polarisation of social and economic ideology is shifting the foundation and allowing erratic movements in state action and fostering areas of active discontent. The traditional rule of states to do as it sees fit is being doubted, democracy is not being inculcated and in some ways states are concerned to remain in control at the expense of democracy.

States have seen an increase in organised discontent ability into numerous unconnected blocks that affect public opinion. This on its own would not have caused much concern as apathetic democracy could hold extremes in check with the usual suspect being in control. As stress builds up over an issue it is not impossible to consider that with sufficient thrust a poplar ‘uprising’ could threaten the cohesion of the state. Also with the rise in external pressures resulting in race and religious tension culminating in acts of violence, it has brought in to sharp focus just how much little in-depth control states have over its population and how open it is to the influence of external factions. Perhaps it is also the shift in who controls states machinery that will act as a precursor or precipitate a war, a sudden change in organisational structure like democracy to dictatorship or secularism to theocratic control.


To counter these effects the states and economic interest will attempt to hold onto controlling power by incrementing draconian means – In the name of peace, securing its population and defeating ‘the enemy’. This will mean imprisoning the population behind controlling laws and defeating democratic principles eventual moving towards a ‘voluntary’ dictatorship. This is not a position that would encourage statehood building with others; stress will result and can lead to conflict born out of perverse and misguided survival self interest.

War is avoidable and it is desirable not to allow stress points to develop to a war but regrettable stress points sometimes have to be fought through before reason has a chance to mature. Some stress points are obvious, like energy, environment and cultural ideology, other less so like economic self impoverishment, Taiwan, Israel, market exhaustion and genetics.

The real difficult with a future war is that it is likely to expose the internal fragmentation and weaknesses of a country so that numerous internal conflicts arise as occurred in Africa, Ireland, Palestine etc. These types of conflicts are not readily capable of being state negotiated to the complete satisfaction of all if there is no recognised governing authority guiding the faction’s actions. When a breakdown occurs the power of these factions generally resides within diverse civil population potentially uncontrollable with some elements using force and intimidation to stake a position. The different factions will want to gain some element of power leading to a continuance of long term civil disruption. This fracturing can affect even the most organised of current cultures particularly if it is socially, economical, structurally and racially of an overall pyramid like construction.

All of the stress elements, resources, cultural, economic and faction growth are in play just now, so for the moment there is little chance of avoiding another war for as the short term gain to be the dominant power seem beguiling, tensions will desire to secure its position of self interest to perhaps enact point 1 and lose.

The methodology of a future war is likely to be primarily economically driven, leading to the perversion of fundamentalism, heightened civil discord action, unresponsive and inappropriate governmental action. As states seek ways to be self sustaining against an unstoppable ecological change and maintain their power base, harsh invasive controls will be promulgated. In such a time, justification of positions will drive efforts to gain supremacy of arguments even to the extent of eventually fostering future eugenics and genetics to shape the nature and bio- sphere of humans.

If saps are clever and can read the signs, a war is winnable if a start is made on amelioration now, (point 2) but conceivably not yet. Reasons, existentialism with emerging practicalities and emotive ideology have to fight it out.





Renot31.8.06©